diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'common/cli.c')
-rw-r--r-- | common/cli.c | 218 |
1 files changed, 218 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/common/cli.c b/common/cli.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..272b028 --- /dev/null +++ b/common/cli.c @@ -0,0 +1,218 @@ +/* + * (C) Copyright 2000 + * Wolfgang Denk, DENX Software Engineering, wd@denx.de. + * + * Add to readline cmdline-editing by + * (C) Copyright 2005 + * JinHua Luo, GuangDong Linux Center, <luo.jinhua@gd-linux.com> + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ + */ + +#include <common.h> +#include <cli.h> +#include <cli_hush.h> +#include <fdtdec.h> +#include <malloc.h> + +DECLARE_GLOBAL_DATA_PTR; + +/* + * Run a command using the selected parser. + * + * @param cmd Command to run + * @param flag Execution flags (CMD_FLAG_...) + * @return 0 on success, or != 0 on error. + */ +int run_command(const char *cmd, int flag) +{ +#ifndef CONFIG_SYS_HUSH_PARSER + /* + * cli_run_command can return 0 or 1 for success, so clean up + * its result. + */ + if (cli_simple_run_command(cmd, flag) == -1) + return 1; + + return 0; +#else + return parse_string_outer(cmd, + FLAG_PARSE_SEMICOLON | FLAG_EXIT_FROM_LOOP); +#endif +} + +/* + * Run a command using the selected parser, and check if it is repeatable. + * + * @param cmd Command to run + * @param flag Execution flags (CMD_FLAG_...) + * @return 0 (not repeatable) or 1 (repeatable) on success, -1 on error. + */ +int run_command_repeatable(const char *cmd, int flag) +{ +#ifndef CONFIG_SYS_HUSH_PARSER + return cli_simple_run_command(cmd, flag); +#else + /* + * parse_string_outer() returns 1 for failure, so clean up + * its result. + */ + if (parse_string_outer(cmd, + FLAG_PARSE_SEMICOLON | FLAG_EXIT_FROM_LOOP)) + return -1; + + return 0; +#endif +} + +int run_command_list(const char *cmd, int len, int flag) +{ + int need_buff = 1; + char *buff = (char *)cmd; /* cast away const */ + int rcode = 0; + + if (len == -1) { + len = strlen(cmd); +#ifdef CONFIG_SYS_HUSH_PARSER + /* hush will never change our string */ + need_buff = 0; +#else + /* the built-in parser will change our string if it sees \n */ + need_buff = strchr(cmd, '\n') != NULL; +#endif + } + if (need_buff) { + buff = malloc(len + 1); + if (!buff) + return 1; + memcpy(buff, cmd, len); + buff[len] = '\0'; + } +#ifdef CONFIG_SYS_HUSH_PARSER + rcode = parse_string_outer(buff, FLAG_PARSE_SEMICOLON); +#else + /* + * This function will overwrite any \n it sees with a \0, which + * is why it can't work with a const char *. Here we are making + * using of internal knowledge of this function, to avoid always + * doing a malloc() which is actually required only in a case that + * is pretty rare. + */ + rcode = cli_simple_run_command_list(buff, flag); + if (need_buff) + free(buff); +#endif + + return rcode; +} + +/****************************************************************************/ + +#if defined(CONFIG_CMD_RUN) +int do_run(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc, char * const argv[]) +{ + int i; + + if (argc < 2) + return CMD_RET_USAGE; + + for (i = 1; i < argc; ++i) { + char *arg; + + arg = getenv(argv[i]); + if (arg == NULL) { + printf("## Error: \"%s\" not defined\n", argv[i]); + return 1; + } + + if (run_command(arg, flag) != 0) + return 1; + } + return 0; +} +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_OF_CONTROL +bool cli_process_fdt(const char **cmdp) +{ + /* Allow the fdt to override the boot command */ + char *env = fdtdec_get_config_string(gd->fdt_blob, "bootcmd"); + if (env) + *cmdp = env; + /* + * If the bootsecure option was chosen, use secure_boot_cmd(). + * Always use 'env' in this case, since bootsecure requres that the + * bootcmd was specified in the FDT too. + */ + return fdtdec_get_config_int(gd->fdt_blob, "bootsecure", 0) != 0; +} + +/* + * Runs the given boot command securely. Specifically: + * - Doesn't run the command with the shell (run_command or parse_string_outer), + * since that's a lot of code surface that an attacker might exploit. + * Because of this, we don't do any argument parsing--the secure boot command + * has to be a full-fledged u-boot command. + * - Doesn't check for keypresses before booting, since that could be a + * security hole; also disables Ctrl-C. + * - Doesn't allow the command to return. + * + * Upon any failures, this function will drop into an infinite loop after + * printing the error message to console. + */ +void cli_secure_boot_cmd(const char *cmd) +{ + cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp; + int rc; + + if (!cmd) { + printf("## Error: Secure boot command not specified\n"); + goto err; + } + + /* Disable Ctrl-C just in case some command is used that checks it. */ + disable_ctrlc(1); + + /* Find the command directly. */ + cmdtp = find_cmd(cmd); + if (!cmdtp) { + printf("## Error: \"%s\" not defined\n", cmd); + goto err; + } + + /* Run the command, forcing no flags and faking argc and argv. */ + rc = (cmdtp->cmd)(cmdtp, 0, 1, (char **)&cmd); + + /* Shouldn't ever return from boot command. */ + printf("## Error: \"%s\" returned (code %d)\n", cmd, rc); + +err: + /* + * Not a whole lot to do here. Rebooting won't help much, since we'll + * just end up right back here. Just loop. + */ + hang(); +} +#endif /* CONFIG_OF_CONTROL */ + +void cli_loop(void) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_SYS_HUSH_PARSER + parse_file_outer(); + /* This point is never reached */ + for (;;); +#else + cli_simple_loop(); +#endif /*CONFIG_SYS_HUSH_PARSER*/ +} + +void cli_init(void) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_SYS_HUSH_PARSER + u_boot_hush_start(); +#endif + +#if defined(CONFIG_HUSH_INIT_VAR) + hush_init_var(); +#endif +} |